THE nuclear-armed state needs to constitute and put in place a robust and credible nuclear command and control structure to efficiently employ and manage its nuclear weapons. This ensures that the nuclear weapons are available to deploy at the time of need and to prevent the inadvertent, unauthorized and accidental use of nuclear weapons. Pakistan has established a unified command and control known as ‘National Command Authority’ (NCA) chaired by the Prime Minister of the country to manage its nuclear forces. It is a civilian-led central command-and-control system for managing nuclear infrastructure and strategic assets.This institutional, mature and centralized nuclear command architecture has evolved systematically since 1999. The NCA received statutory authorization by the Parliament (Majili-e-Shoora) of Pakistan and the President of Pakistan’s assent on March 9, 2010. The National Command Authority Act, 2010 states:
“Whereas, it is necessary and expedient to establish an Authority for complete command and control over research, development, production and use of nuclear and space technologies and other related applications in various fields and to provide for the safety and security of all personnel, facilities, information, installations or organizations and other activities therewith or ancillary thereto.” The NCA Act created a three-tiered institutional structure over the country’s nuclear weapons. The Employment Control Committee and Development Control Committee constituted one tier; the Strategic Plans Division (SPD) constituted the second tier; and the three services’ strategic forces command constituted the third tier.
Prime Minister of Pakistan chaired the apex Employment Control Committee. As the name suggested, the Employment Control Committee dealt with what could be defined broadly as “nuclear strategy,” including targeting policy and the conduct of nuclear operations. It provides policy directions in peacetime and has the authority to order, control and direct use/employ tri-services strategic forces during war. The final authority to launch a nuclear strike rests with the NCA; the chairperson must cast the final vote. The requirement of a unanimous decision made clear that no individual, including the Prime Minister of Pakistan, was authorized to use nuclear weapons. This arrangement prevents any irrational decision by an individual.
The Development Control Committee dealt with the planning and development of nuclear forces. It exercises day-to-day technical, financial and administrative control over strategic organizations and oversees the systematic development of strategic weapons programs. The NCA Act 2010 is being amended to abolish the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC), as Deputy Chairman, NCA, who led the Development Control Committee’s work. The Chief of Defense Forces (CDF) is now the Deputy Chairman NCA, and Commander, Strategic Nuclear Command (a four-star general) commands the strategic forces. Indeed, the 2010 NCA Act is still in effect, except for the preceding changes. Hence, there is no change in the spirit and letter of Pakistan’s NCA. The Strategic Plans Division is a secretariat to the NCA and is entrusted with the task of developing and managing the country’s nuclear capability across all dimensions, including operational, planning, weapons development, arms control and disarmament affairs, command and control, storage, safety, security, budgets, etc.
Over 27 years, NCA and SPD have nurtured a sophisticated, robust safety and security culture, which rests on four pillars, i.e., a robust command and control system under the National Command Authority; a thorough safety and security regulatory regime; a comprehensive system of export control management; and an extensive program of international cooperation. Consequently, it has succeeded in preventing nuclear accidents, unauthorized-use incidents, and reckless nuclear signaling. Precisely, professional stewardship has succeeded in developing a fail-safe culture. The declassified information about the periodic meetings of the NCA and the SPD revealed a range of overt and covert measures adopted to guard the country’s nuclear program. The physical-protection apparatus and custodial safeguards arrangements made Pakistani nuclear assets, both civilian and military, inaccessible to unauthorized outsiders. Thus, N.C.A. nurtured a national consensus on Pakistan’s nuclear program security and constituted a vigilant custodian of its nuclear program. There has been no incident of sabotage or theft of Pakistani nuclear material to date.
Pakistan has vigorously enforced UNSC Resolution 1540 on proliferation. Its Parliament legislated the Act — Export Control on Goods, Technologies, Material and Equipment related to Nuclear and Biological Weapons and their Delivery Systems Act, 2004 — in September 2004. This Act aimed to strengthen further controls on the export of sensitive technologies, mainly related to nuclear and biological weapons and their means of delivery. Pakistan’s conduct during the sporadic crises with India reflected restraint, proportion, control and command confidence. For instance, during the four-day war with India in May 2025, Pakistan restored deterrence without reckless nuclear signaling. Pakistan’s crisis behavior demonstrated that credible deterrence and restraint can coexist. This responsible restraint should be seen as command discipline, not weakness. To conclude, despite the commendable NCA structure and performance, Pakistani policymakers need to continuously conduct internal reviews of command-and-control and constantly advance fail-safe practices within their own command culture, threat environment and national security requirements.
—The writer is Vice Chancellor of the Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad.
