THE notion that Afghanistan is the “Graveyard of Empires” is one of history’s most romantic yet most perilous illusions. This phrase we encounter regularly—in newspapers, political talk shows and diplomatic circles—is a simplistic way to explain why global powers, from the British to the Soviets and to the USA, eventually packed up and left the rugged terrain.
From Pakistan’s perspective, this myth of the “Graveyard of Empires” is historically inaccurate; it is merely a distraction from its own painful geographical reality. We are not a faraway “empire” that wants to capture Afghanistan or can simply withdraw to some distant land after failure to subdue Afghanistan. We are an indispensable neighbour, bound to Afghanistan by geography, ethnicity and a shared, turbulent history. The Afghan Taliban regime must drop the imperial narrative and face this regional reality.
The “Graveyard” label gained popularity after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989. It suggests that the Afghan tribes, having a fierce desire for independence, inevitably defeat the invaders. While Afghan resilience is undeniable, this explanation conveniently omits the massive and decisive role played by external powers and geopolitics. In reality, the retreat of the British, the Soviets and the USA was the result of either their overreach or externally funded proxy wars by their rivals or simply because of their own shifting priorities and not a final, decisive battlefield defeat by a singular Afghan entity.
Afghanistan’s actual history is not defined by its ability to repel conquerors; it is defined by its role as the Crossroads of Civilizations. It has been ruled by Greeks, Persians, Mughals and various regional dynasties. The real challenge in Afghanistan has always been the failure to establish and maintain a stable, centralized government that can command the loyalty of its powerful regional, tribal and ethnic components. In the absence of any foreign invader, Afghanistan has repeatedly fallen into civil war with different warlords and tribal elders competing amongst each other.
For Pakistan, the relationship with Afghanistan is fundamentally different from that of any outside power. We share a 2,670 KM, largely porous border with tribes living across on both sides. The Pashtun population straddles the Durand Line, making it impossible to treat cross-border issues as purely ‘foreign-funded.’ Though there are ample proofs with the Pakistani Government of Indian-sponsored terrorism across the border, yet the issue needs to be viewed with a broader lens.
Historically, we have witnessed that with the retreat of foreign powers from Afghanistan, the region falls into an instability era. It fuels cross-border terrorist activities. Groups like the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA) take advantage of the quasi-state Afghanistan soil as a safe haven to plan attacks on Pakistani citizens and institutions. The surge in cross-border attacks on security forces and civilian targets in Khyber- Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan demonstrates that the Taliban’s failure to act decisively has cost Pakistani lives and destabilized the entire region.
In addition, the foreign power invasion has forced millions of Afghans to take refuge in Pakistan, a humanitarian act that has also placed a significant economic and social strain on our country. Thus, for peaceful coexistence, it is in Pakistan’s interest to have a stable Afghanistan and our foreign policy must be focused on achieving that.
Pakistan’s foreign policy must abandon the complex and strategically bankrupt doctrine of “strategic depth” and shift the conversation away from rhetorical debates like the Durand Line. While maintaining our sovereign stance, the focus must be solely on quantifiable, verifiable security actions by the Taliban regime. We must make it absolutely clear that action against anti-Pakistan terror groups (specifically the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA)) is a non-negotiable precondition for peaceful coexistence.
Pakistan has an economic leverage against Afghanistan that can be used as the main tool; Afghanistan needs access to the world and Pakistan’s ports and markets are its lifeline. We must strictly link economic facilitation—transit trade agreements, port access and infrastructure—to full cooperation on border security and counter-terrorism. This means defining clear benchmarks, such as TTP/BLA camp dismantling or handover of specific individuals and linking incremental economic facilitation directly to those outcomes. The progress against these benchmarks can be monitored by countries that both Pakistan and Afghanistan trust, like Saudi Arab, Qatar or Turkey.
In addition, there is a need to present a unified regional front by prioritizing working with immediate neighbours like China, Iran and the Central Asian States. This collective weight is far more effective than unilateral demands from Islamabad. By focusing on regional stability and economic development, we de-hyphenate ourselves from Western interests (TTP/BLA propaganda against Pakistan) and position Pakistan as a sincere regional partner.
In the end, let me reemphasize that Afghanistan will not be a graveyard for Pakistan, as Pakistan does not want to capture Kabul. Afghanistan will, however, remain a turbulent yet vital neighbour. Our policy must be grounded in realism — one that encourages the Taliban to assume full responsibility for its territory and its choices. By fostering security and economic cooperation, we can move beyond outdated narratives and focus on safeguarding our own future with clarity, confidence and care.
—The writer is a freelance journalist based in Manchester, UK, with a focus on South Asian geopolitics.
