INDIA gained the world’s attention as populism in the country was defeated by democracy. This occurred when Modi’s hard-core Hindutva stance did not help him win a majority in the election. Out of the 273 seats needed to form the government, BJP won 240. However, the BJP-led NDA won a total of 303 seats in the Lok Sabha, while the opposition parties’ alliance secured 233 seats. Consequently, the opposition is now in a much stronger position to influence policies and decisions.
PM Modi’s emphasis on strong Hindutva narrative is a strategic use of ethnic identity for political purpose known as ethnic instrumentalization. In fact, ethnic instrumentalization is often employed by populist leaders to unite people of one ethnicity by creating hatred against others. This strategy aims to portray the other group as a security threat to the nation. As a result, people begin to believe in the leaders’ hard-line approach and viewing their electoral win as the remedy for fabricated security concern.
However, the 2024 Indian elections demonstrated that people were not blinded, and democracy prevailed in its true sense. Consequently, the extremist stance backfired, preventing him from winning the expected majority. The party’s use of strong rhetoric did not pay off, and actions like jailing opposition leaders, using divisive campaign rhetoric like calling Muslim votes ‘votes jihad’ and cracking down on protests and passing Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) which discriminate Muslims backfired on him. Therefore, in public affairs, we might see other parties significantly influencing decisions. Hence the coalition government’s new focus would be on development and efforts to alleviate poverty, especially measures to create employment for the rural class.
Under the new coalition government, it is crucial to understand the expected changes in India’s policies and the BJP’s approach. The BJP might either strengthen its Hindutva stance or revise policies to accommodate the opposition. However, Modi’s initial days in office suggest a continuation of past policies, as indicated by the continuity in key ministerial posts such as defence, finance, foreign affairs, and education. In the coming years, or until the next elections, Modi is unlikely to seek normalization with Pakistan. He may focus on security issues similar to past events like Uri and Pulwama to divert public attention from domestic affairs and garner mass support. Initiating security tensions with Pakistan could be a strategy, as it previously helped him win elections, such as in the case of Pulwama in 2018.
Regarding China, Modi is expected to take a cautious approach to prevent escalation, similar to the strategy employed during the Doklam standoff. India will use controlled pressure tactics to assert its firm stance without risking a major conflict. In the Indo-Pacific region, both India and China are bolstering their military capabilities. Within these grey areas lie potential shifts from mere contestations to heightened security tensions. So generally in foreign affairs, there will not be major policy shifts as its broad-ranging policies align with India’s strategic objectives, which are independent of party lines. Therefore, the strategies seen over the past five years are likely to continue.
India under Modi will continue strengthening its relationship with the USA and Western states in pursuit of military modernization, technological advancements, and economic opportunities, positioning itself as an alternative to China. India has always adopted an approach of strategic autonomy in its relationships with major powers. For example, during the Ukraine crisis, India continued its trade with Russia. This suggests that India will similarly avoid escalating tensions with China. India’s strategic approach regarding major powers, as described by Foreign Minister Jaishankar, is to “engage America, manage China, cultivate Europe, and reassure Russia.”
India aims to assume a leadership role among smaller South Asian nations, seeking to maintain their alignment within its sphere of influence and deter their participation in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). India provides enticing economic packages to these countries and highlight the risks associated with BRI induced debt traps to keep these smaller states under its influence. In Nepal, India has invested in hydropower projects, infrastructure development projects, and electricity projects. Similarly, in Bangladesh, India invested US$8 billion. After pandemic and economic meltdown, India provided emergency loan to Sri Lanka. Likewise, in Bhutan and Nepal, India invested in various infrastructure developing projects.
To wrap it up, the 2024 Indian elections have restored India’s democratic image, enhancing its international standing. To maintain this, the BJP must address real issues like unemployment and shift away from solely appealing to the Hindutva base. This approach can reduce criticisms of undermining democracy while maintaining their grip on power and prevent societal division, which threatens India’s long-term social security. By incorporating minorities and ensuring equal rights and representation, India can prove to be a truly democratic country. With internal stability, it can fulfil its role as a leader among smaller South Asian countries, strengthening its influence and fostering regional cooperation.
—The writer is contributing columnist.
