Taliban and Iran border clashes
AFTER the dawn of the Afghan Taliban on the horizon of Kabul, Tehran had to swallow the bitter pill of accommodating the anti-Iran hard-core Sunni regime in Afghanistan. Further, where the two have various differences, at the same time, there is a convergence of interests that necessitates their maintaining working relationship. And the current Helmand River water dispute is one of the pressing issues the two countries are grappling with. The glaring threat of ISKP faced by both states to their security is likely to prevent them from letting their relations be marred by the water crisis.
After the failed attempt of Reza Shah Pahlavi’s government in Iran and Mohammad Zahir Shah’s government in Afghanistan in 1939, the US took charge. In 1948, under the supervision of the US, a three-person commission was formed to solve the dispute between the two states. The Helmand River Delta Commission presented its report on February 28, 1951. However, Iran rejected the report and demanded a larger share of water from the said river. Later, the Court Minister of the Shah, Asadollah Alam, claimed in 1969 that Afghanistan had offered more water in return for its easy access to Iranian ports.
Amir Abbas Hoveida of Iran and Mohammad Musa Shafiq of Afghanistan signed an agreement four years later, in 1973, addressing Iran’s grievances. Tehran allowed Afghanistan access to Iranian ports without any preconditions. However, due to political circumstances, the treaty could neither be ratified nor fully implemented. For instance, the coup of 1973, the Communist Revolution of 1978, the subsequent USSR’s intervention, Iranian revolution of 1979 and last but not the least, the Taliban government in 1995-96 in Afghanistan.
The current issues about Helmand water distribution took on a new turn after the threatening tone of Iranian President Raisi. On May 18, during a visit to Sistan-Balochistan, Raisi said that the IEA (Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan) regime should take Iran’s water rights seriously. Iranian authorities called upon the IEA to open the gates of the Kajaki Dam so that water flows toward Iran. Since Tehran claims it receives only 4% of the agreed water.
The IEA, on the other hand, emphasized that Tehran should solve the issue through dialogue. It has the stance that Afghanistan itself is facing water shortage due to the drought. The IEA further claims that even if the gates are opened, the water level is too low to flow toward Iran. However, Iran is not ready to accept what the IEA claims without the examination of technical experts. Commenting on the issue, President Raisi maintained that Iran is ready to drop its concerns if the experts suggest so.
Although the two parties are at a crossroads, they have no other choice but to negotiate. The issue of ISKP is Iran’s and the IEA’s Achilles’ heel. ISIS and its South Asian office, ‘AL Saddiq Office’ (ISKP), pose a serious and existential threat to the survival of both IEA and Iran.
ISKP is active against the IEA and is one of the most active and lethal groups resisting the IEA’s government. It has carried out multiple suicide and guerilla attacks against the regime. The ISKP is also brutally attacking the Shia minority. For instance, it has claimed responsibility for 13 assaults against Hazaras since the Taliban seized control of Afghanistan in August 2021, resulting in the death and injury of at least 700 people.
Also, ISIS was brazenly threatening the Iranian regime when it was at its peak in Syria and Iraq. ISIS’s main target was the Shia population in both of the aforementioned states, and Iran was their next target. But now, as ISIS is weak in Syria and Iraq, ISKP in Afghanistan is emerging as a new challenge for Iranian security.
Therefore, the common enemy was the reason for the rapprochement between Iran and Afghan Taliban. They broke the impasse in their relations and maintained clandestine and furtive communication to fight ISKP. It happened in 2015, when Iran realized that the Afghan government at the time could not fight ISKP effectively. This was a pragmatic approach by Tehran vis-à-vis the Afghan Taliban.
In a nutshell, no matter how tense their relations may be, they cannot afford an armed confrontation owing to the presence of their common enemy, the ISKP. Fractures in their relationship would only strengthen ISKP, and it is not acceptable or even affordable to any one of them. Therefore, negotiations and a timely agreement are needed to settle the current crisis and avoid any inconvenience in future relations between them owing to climate change and the resultant water shortage faced by both of them. Therefore, their hostilities would only provide their adversaries with an opportunity to capitalize on their differences and exploit the situation to their own benefit.
—The writer is MPhil International Relations from NDU and Research Associate at PICSS, Islamabad
