1971 was a victory stolen from Pakistan Army. A victory that would have sealed the fate of Indian hegemony and irredentism viv a vis East Pakistan burying all proxies like Mukti Bahni under the carapace of a solidarity stronger than ethno-linguistic particularism of Bengali nationalism. Yahya Khan who had presided over the disintegration of Pakistan stated in his mea culpa later as a prisoner of Chief Martial Law Administrator Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, before Hamoodur Rehman Commission, that his sincere efforts to hand over the power to the elected representatives of people had been thwarted by the obduracy of a power hungry Bhutto and an anti-union agitator ie Shiekh Mujeebur Rehman. As per Yahya he tried his best to convince Shiekh Mujeeb to accept the demand of West Pakistani political leadership to evolve a consensus about the main elements of the future constitution before convening the National Assembly session.
The army’s deployment in East Pakistan was dictated by the political consideration to deny rebels a border enclave for Bangladesh’s independence, which proved faulty due to the absence of defence in depth denuding the Dacca Bowl of much needed layered defence. The rapier like thrusts by Indian Army were more successful due to above faulty military strategy by Pakistani planners. Pakistan Army troops vastly outnumbered and without any air cover fought valiantly against the Indian troops and by the end of war all major cities were in Pakistani hands except Jessore which had been vacated due to tactical reasons. Jamalpur was one such battle location that saw the heaviest fighting. On the night of 20/21 November Indian Army supported by tanks advanced on 23 salients inside East Pakistan.
In one of those salients where Indian Army had penetrated north of Mymensingh, Pakistan’s 31 Baloch, under its charismatic and intrepid Commanding Officer, Lt Col Sultan SJ bar (Later Brigadier) was dominating whole of the north despite heavy odds stacked against his unit. The fortress defence at Jamalpur was organized very competently by CO 31 Baluch who writes in his book “Stolen Victory” that the defence was developed through the active help of local volunteers called “Razakars’ without whose help the battalion would never have been able to dig trenches all around the garrison thus making it impregnable. The Indians had a force ratio advantage of 1:6 over Pakistan’s troops.
The Indian Brigade Commander Brigadier Hardit Singh Kler whose brigade had encircled 31 Baluch on 10 December 1971, defending Jamalpur Garrison, wrote to CO 31 Baluch:- “To, The Commander Jamalpur Garrison, I am directed to inform you that your garrison has been cut off from all sides and you have no escape route available to you. One brigade with full complement of artillery has already been built up and another will be striking by morning. In addition you have been given a foretaste of a small element of our air force with a lot more to come. The situation as far as you are concerned is hopeless. Your higher commanders have already ditched you. I expect your reply before 6.30 p.m. today failing which I will be constrained to deliver the final blow for which purpose 40 sorties of MIGs have been allotted to me. An immediate reply is solicited. “Brigadier HS Kler.Comd”
The reply of Lt Colonel Sultan was a classic:- “Dear Brig, Hope this finds you in high spirits. Your letter asking us to surrender had been received. I want to tell you that the fighting you have seen so far is very little, in fact the fighting has not even started. So let us stop negotiating and start the fight. 40 sorties, I may point out, are inadequate. Ask for many more. Your point about treating your messenger well was superfluous. It shows how you under-estimate my boys. I hope he liked his tea. Give my love to the Muktis. Let me see you with a sten in your hand next time instead of the pen you seem to have such mastery over,
Now get on and fight. Yours sincerely: Commander Jamalpur Fortress”. For the Pakistani soldiers this was their finest hour, fighting against heavy odds with their backs to the wall, bloodied but unbowed. The Indians tried 31 air sorties yet failed to break the will of the doughty minders of the Jamalpur barricades. At the end Lt Colonel Sultan was ordered to break through the encirclement and reach Dacca. A debonair act of courage, skill and self-immolation was witnessed as the battalion under its valiant CO tried to break through the Indian encirclement launching bold frontal attacks. The battalion lost 230 soldiers and succeeded in breaking through the Indian encirclement. The saga of courage written through the blood of 230 martyrs was a golden chapter in the annals of country’s military history.
The battle of Jamalpur had shown to the world and the Indians that Pakistan’s Army possessed a skill and determination that was unmatched compared to the cautious machinations of an enemy relying more on the craftiness of Bengali rebels and the weight of numbers. The battle was a metaphor for the valour and professionalism of Pakistan Army whose victory was stolen through a political and diplomatic defeat.
— The writer, a Retired Brig, is a PhD scholar at NUST, Islamabad.
