THE protection of the nuclear facilities from internal and external sabotage is imperative for states with nuclear programs. The military facilities are adequately guarded, but the protection of civilian nuclear facilities has also received serious attention from the nuclear establishments due to the fears that a radiological disaster as a result of a military attack on the nuclear facility – whether deliberate or accidental – could lead to radiation exposure to facility workers, nearby civilians and the surrounding environment. Therefore, the international legal regime concerning nuclear safety and security and emergency preparedness, is aimed at protecting workers, people and the environment from the harmful effects of nuclear radiation.
Currently, the nuclear facilities are vulnerable to inadvertent or deliberate military strikes in conflict zones and volatile regions around the world. In South Asia, India and Pakistan operate several nuclear facilities for both peaceful and military purposes. The conflicting nature of their relations alarms that they may hit each other’s nuclear facilities covertly or overtly. The encouraging sign is that the Indian and Pakistani policymakers realize the repercussions of a radiological disaster from an attack on each other’s nuclear facilities. Therefore, they agreed on the Agreement between India and Pakistan on the Prohibition of Attack Against Nuclear Installations and Facilities (India-Pakistan Non-Attack Agreement)on December 31, 1988.
The Agreement was ratified and entered into force on January 1, 1991, on the condition that the two exchange updated lists of nuclear sites in their respective states on January 1 each year. Since then, India and Pakistan have diligently maintained this confidence-building measure during the last 34 years—even in times of crisis or in the absence of official communication channels. On January 1, 2026, India and Pakistan, through diplomatic channels simultaneously in New Delhi and Islamabad, exchanged the list of nuclear installations and facilities covered under the Agreement. This is the 35th consecutive exchange of such lists between New Delhi and Islamabad, the first one having taken place on January 1, 1992.
The India-Pakistan Non-Attack Agreement is one of the most effective nuclear confidence-building measures between India and Pakistan. The Agreement is grounded on the first and second protocols to the Geneva Convention’s Articles 56 and 15. These articles state, “Works or installations containing dangerous forces, namely dams, dykes and nuclear electrical generating stations, shall not be made the object of attack, even where these objects are military objectives, if such attack may cause the release of dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian population.”
India-Pakistan Non-Attack Agreement provides for refraining from undertaking, encouraging or participating in, directly or indirectly, any action aimed at causing destruction or damage to any nuclear installation or facility—nuclear power and research reactors, fuel fabrication, uranium enrichment, isotopes separation and reprocessing facilities and any other installations with fresh or irradiated nuclear fuel and materials in any form and establishments storing significant quantities of radioactive materials in India and Pakistan. Thus far, lists related to nuclear facilities have been exchanged. However, the Indian and Pakistani lists need to be refurbished/updated to include the new facilities.
The alarming puzzle is that India and Pakistan are reluctant to consensually cope with the increasing risks due to the steady advancements in their missile inventories and shifts in their nuclear postures. They seem unresponsive to the growing dangers posed by technical problems, human error and procedural lapses, due to the rapid modernization of their military hardware and the increase in nuclear energy in their energy mix. Moreover, with the improvement in missile ranges and accuracy, targeting each other’s nuclear facilities is technically possible for both countries, even if these nuclear facilities are not near their adjacent territorial borders.
The vulnerability of nuclear facilities to missile strike—accident, inadvertent or deliberate draws one’s attention towards the firing and crashing of an Indian supersonic missile in Pakistani territory on March 9, 2022. New Delhi’s delay in announcing the causes of the missile misfire (technical malfunction during routine maintenance), suspension of the mutual channel of communications, absence of prearrangement to deal with such a grave situation diplomatically and deadlock in relations since the 2019 post-Pulwama military standoff collectively contributed to Pakistan’s interpretation of the incident, i.e., “it was not a technological error but a deliberate fire with ulterior strategic objectives.” Islamabad warned Delhi to “be mindful of the unpleasant consequences of such negligence” and to avoid a repeat.
The Indian supersonic missile episode sent shockwaves through South Asia. The conflicting New Delhi and Islamabad perspectives on the Missile episode testify to the height of mistrust, necessitating that policymakers and security observers objectively revisit and streamline the existing nuclear CBMs and negotiate a few new ones to promote trust, transparency and stability between India and Pakistan. So that South Asia would be saved from the accidental and inadvertent nuclear crisis.
To conclude, the scope of the India-Pakistan Non-Attack Agreement can be widened to include other critical infrastructure, i.e., a few sensitive civilian and economic facilities, including National Command and Control Headquarters, to minimize the fear of leadership decapitation. Expanding its scope also establishes procedures for sharing information on terrorist threats to critical infrastructure. However, efforts to extend or alter the Agreement could inadvertently undermine the solid foundation already in place. Hence, any change in its scope shall be made prudently.
—The writer is Prof at the School of Politics and IR, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad.
