Bisma Batool
THE Brahmaputra River is Asia’s mightiest river, originating from the Himalayas, near Mount Kailash in Tibet. The river flows from the Tibetan Plateau, entering India at Arunachal Pradesh as the Siang River, then becomes the Brahmaputra in Assam and Jamuna in Bangladesh eventually falling into the Bay of Bengal. In its upper course, it is also known as either Tsang Po or Yarlung Zangbo, meaning “purifier”. This transboundary river supports the living of millions of people across China, India and Bangladesh through agriculture, fishery, water and hydropower. However, the river’s journey across multiple sensitive borders has turned it into a point of geopolitical contention.
China, being the upstream riparian state and claims Arunachal Pradesh as “South Tibet”, has an edge as it controls the flow of water and India heavily depends on its flow. Unlike the Indus Water Treaty there is no treaty or institutional framework between India and China over the Brahmaputra River. Both countries rely only on limited Memoranda of Understanding and Hydrological data-sharing. However, it is weakened due to territorial disputes.
In recent years, China has expanded hydropower development in Medog (Motou) County near the Indian border. Reports state construction began in mid-2025 on what is expected to be the world’s largest hydropower dam, costing over $170 billion with a capacity of 60–80 GW. China describes it as a “project of the century” for ecological protection, clean energy and regional development. However, India has raised concerns over flow regulation, data opacity and China’s strategic leverage. Some analysts fear water flows could be reduced by up to 85%, threatening livelihoods and livestock downstream.
India argues that, amid territorial disputes such as the Galwan and Doklam standoffs, the dam could become a tool of hybrid warfare. China insists it will neither divert water nor harm downstream countries, but limited transparency continues to fuel mistrust.
New Delhi has responded with diplomatic protests, a strategic infrastructure push and accelerated domestic projects. India has countered China’s Medog dam with the Siang Upper Multipurpose Project (SUMP) in Arunachal Pradesh, featuring an 11,000 MW mega-dam on the Siang River. Adopting a “dam for a dam” approach, India aims to enhance flood control, water storage, hydropower generation and strategic resilience. Its broader $77-billion hydropower programme envisages more than 200 dams across the Northeast, targeting 75 GW of capacity. Despite local protests, officials, including Chief Minister Pema Khandu, have described Chinese dams as “time-ticking bombs” and an “existential threat”, arguing these projects are vital for national security and energy independence. Recently, Victor Gao cautioned India against the weaponisation of water in the context of the Indus Water Treaty, urging respect for transboundary agreements by stating, “Don’t do unto others what you don’t want others to do unto you.”
The India-China water issue is defined as “hydro-politics”, where water is intertwined with territory, energy security and climate resilience. This risks acceleration without comprehensive institutional agreements and comprehensive building measures. Research analysts and experts highlight this water war at an alarming rate and urge sustained diplomacy to prevent mistrust from turning resources into open competition, through confidence-building measures.
In conclusion, China’s mega-dam project and India’s proactive response have intensified the situation with complex challenges and can be balanced through cooperative governance. As both nations continue their economic ascent, their capacity to handle this “river of power” through peaceful cooperation could prove just as essential as resolving any territorial dispute.
—The writer occasionally contributes.
