US-Russia rivalry over Ukraine & NATO’s expansion
UKRAINE has been pivotal to determining the scope of relationship between Russia and the US. Russia’s security policy makers have currently published a draft agreement — proposing to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) — measures to ensure a model of bilateral security structure.
In this regard, Russia has asked NATO to refrain from further eastward enlargement, including the accession of Ukraine, and to cease any military activity in Ukraine and other countries in the Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus and Central Asia.
Moscow has strongly suggested that Russia and NATO must reaffirm that they do not consider each other as adversaries.
Russia and the NATO member states as of May 27, 1997, would be banned from military deployment and weaponry on the territory of any European state.
For more than 20 years, the narrative of the alleged “broken promise” of not enlarging NATO eastward is part and parcel of Russia’s post-Soviet identity. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that this narrative has resurfaced in the context of the Ukraine crisis.
On November 30th 2021, a report published by Reuters ‘Putin warns Russia will act if NATO crosses its red lines in Ukraine’ said that Putin mentioned what is at stake if NATO expands eastward while they deployed the Aegis Ashore missile defence systems in Poland and Romania’.
From the Western perspective, NATO has, gradually and systematically taken up some defensive and proportionate steps in response to a changed security environment in the European continent and beyond.
In response to Russia’s use of military force against its neighbours, Allies requested a greater NATO presence in the Baltic region. In 2016, we deployed four multinational battle groups – or “enhanced forward presence” – to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland.
In 2017, the battle groups became fully operational. More than 4,500 troops from Europe and North America work closely together with home defence forces.
The NATO security policy specialists argue that the Russian policies in Europe are incoherent and attached to models of European security that have little or no relevance to other states or that actually alarm them.
Russia still disdains the small states, thinking them to be of no consequence, proposes infeasible and objectionable schemes of the European collective security that do not bind it but would bind NATO, and at the same time pursues unilateralist spheres of influence policies in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).
A frank analysis suggests that Russian policy is openly revisionist— demanding border revisions and refusing to sign formal border treaties to recognize the post-1989 changes in Central and Eastern Europe.
Its spokesmen make demands for an exceptional position in Europe or for unworkable security systems that do little to advance faith in Russia’s coherence or goodwill.
Furthermore, its policy statements reveal a continuing addiction to old-fashioned doctrines of zero-sum games, of viewing everything in terms of correlations of antagonistic military forces, and of desires for exclusive rights over small states.
Whereas NATO’s policy process–the new NATO-Russia Council–that remarkably prefigured the final agreement on the Council in May 1997.
Unfortunately, those terms went far beyond giving Russia “a voice but not a veto” and certainly made it clear that Germany will not accept Baltic membership in NATO anytime soon.
Indeed, German Foreign Ministry officials speaking in Moscow openly alluded to the need not to do anything that wounds Russian sensitivities, explicitly giving Russia a veto on future expansion.
Thus, it is unlikely that Germany will ever shoulder the responsibilities of helping to underpin a security regime that is viable for the Baltics.
As for NATO’s presence in Eastern Europe, US/NATO security specialists argue it is at the request of the host nations, and Allied forces uphold the highest standards of conduct, both on and off duty.
As part of NATO Allies’ commitment to transparency, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania host Russian arms control inspectors.
In Estonia, for instance, Russian inspectors recently conducted a Vienna Document Inspection, observing parts of exercise Spring Storm in May and June 2021.
Discerning the likelihood of potential Russian reactions has been nevertheless a vital component of any analysis regarding which posture enhancements the United States and NATO should pursue.
As for Ukraine, for the last twenty years, it has shown its geopolitical tilt towards the West vindicated by the fact that Ukraine’s current President, Volodymyr Zelensky, has pushed back against Russia’s attempts to expand its influence.
The Western opinion holds that Putin wants a Cold War-like treaty with NATO— a move that can stop US-NATO military cooperation with Ukraine—yet seems a gigantic challenge for the Biden Administration.
Ukrainian intelligence services have alleged the Kremlin of aggressive actions on the border with Ukraine, including troop build-up.
However, it was estimated that potential Russian reaction could run the gamut, from tacit acceptance of US-NATO actions and a reduction in any willingness to consider an attack on NATO, to a sharp increase in nearby Russian forces designed to counterbalance the US-NATO moves, to a precipitous escalation to direct conflict.
The fact remains that despite its overall military advantages, NATO faces a clear imbalance in conventional capabilities in regions bordering Russia, such as the Baltics.
On the other hand, Finland, a Nordic country insists its right to join NATO in defiance of Russia. Whereas, Turkey an old NATO’s member, is not comfortable with its policies.
Washington will impose “severe economic harm” on Russia and boost its military presence in Eastern Europe should Moscow invade Ukraine, the White House warned. But it appears that this American warning is unworkable.
Arguably, Russia and NATO members have had more than two decades of post-Soviet strategic interactions, including notable conflicts in Kosovo, Georgia and Ukraine, and several rounds of NATO expansion, all of which occurred alongside substantial variation in relative Russian economic and military capabilities.
The core of US-Russia rivalry is NATO’s article 5 of collective defence since the strategists in Moscow view that the European security culture has been much changed since 1949, is evident from the fact that some of the European states, particularly Germany, does not intend to depend on NATO as far as their security interests are concerned.
To some of the European security analysts, NATO’s eastward enlargement is nothing but Washington’s Trojan horse in Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, a restraint strategy is a wise option to resolve the crisis.
—The writer, an independent ‘IR’ researcher-cum-international law analyst based in Pakistan, is member of European Consortium for Political Research Standing Group on IR, Critical Peace & Conflict Studies, also a member of Washington Foreign Law Society and European Society of International Law.
