THE contrast between Barack Obama’s and Donald Trump’s approaches towards Iran reflects two competing schools of American foreign policy. Obama believed that diplomacy should come first, while Trump has consistently favoured pressure and military deterrence before negotiations. Whether one considers Obama’s policy wiser depends on one’s assessment of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), but the distinction between the two approaches is unmistakable. Obama attempted to contain Iran’s nuclear programme through a negotiated agreement; Trump abandoned that framework and sought to achieve a broader settlement through maximum economic pressure backed by military force.
The political consequences of this strategy are becoming increasingly significant as the 2026 US midterm elections draw closer. Although the final electoral impact remains uncertain, recent opinion polls suggest that only about one-third of Americans support the conflict, while nearly two-thirds believe it was not worth fighting. As history has repeatedly shown, wars abroad often reshape political fortunes at home.
The JCPOA was based on a straightforward calculation. If Iran’s nuclear programme could be subjected to strict international inspections and meaningful restrictions, the immediate risk of nuclear proliferation could be contained without resorting to war. The agreement did not resolve every dispute between Tehran and Washington. It neither addressed Iran’s ballistic missile programme nor curtailed its regional influence and support for armed groups.
President Trump rejected this framework, arguing that it was too narrow and failed to address broader security concerns. His administration concluded that economic sanctions, diplomatic isolation and credible military pressure would compel Tehran to negotiate a more comprehensive agreement. The White House maintained that negotiations conducted from a position of overwhelming strength would produce better results than diplomacy alone.
This fundamental difference continues to shape the debate. Obama sought to reduce tensions by reaching an agreement first. Trump sought to increase the costs of defiance before offering negotiations. Supporters of Obama’s approach argue that diplomacy prevented a major regional war while establishing an effective verification mechanism. Trump’s supporters counter that diplomacy without credible military pressure merely gives an adversary time to strengthen its strategic position.0
The present crisis, therefore, raises an important question: was Trump’s calculation correct? If military pressure ultimately produces a durable agreement, prevents nuclear proliferation and contributes to regional stability, he may claim strategic success. However, if it results in prolonged confrontation, higher energy prices, regional instability and a stronger determination by Iran and other states to enhance their military capabilities, the strategy may ultimately be remembered as a costly strategic miscalculation.
The domestic political implications are already becoming evident. American voters traditionally evaluate presidents not only on foreign policy but also on inflation, fuel prices, economic performance and the safety of their troops. Consequently, the Iran conflict has created a potentially difficult political equation for the Trump Administration. The longer the crisis continues, the more frequently voters are likely to ask three questions: How much is the war costing? What is the endgame? And was the war necessary?
At the same time, comparisons with Obama have become unavoidable. Critics of the former president continue to argue that the JCPOA accommodated Iran without fundamentally changing its regional behaviour. Critics of Trump, however, contend that months of military confrontation followed by renewed diplomatic engagement suggest that negotiations eventually became unavoidable despite the enormous human and economic costs of conflict.
Indeed, Trump’s own public posture has evolved noticeably. He has alternated between threatening overwhelming military action and presenting himself as a leader committed to peace. Reports that he postponed further military strikes while encouraging renewed diplomatic engagement with the support of regional partners have created a fresh opportunity for dialogue. Yet the long history of broken promises, failed ceasefires and deep mutual distrust means that such opportunities remain fragile. The approaching mid-term elections could, therefore, become an indirect referendum on Trump’s Iran policy. If his Administration succeeds in securing a durable settlement, restoring stability to strategic shipping routes and avoiding prolonged military involvement, supporters will argue that “peace through strength” has been vindicated. If, however, the conflict ultimately ends in an agreement broadly similar to one that could have been negotiated before military escalation, critics will question whether the immense costs of war were necessary in the first place.
The strongest criticism of Trump’s strategy is not that it relied on pressure. Pressure can be a legitimate instrument of diplomacy when carefully calibrated. The difficulty arises when pressure becomes a substitute for diplomacy rather than a means of strengthening it. Effective statecraft requires a careful balance between deterrence and dialogue. A more sustainable strategy would ideally follow a logical sequence: deterrence, calibrated pressure, negotiations and a verifiable agreement. When that sequence instead becomes threats, bombing, escalation, retaliation, destruction and only then a return to negotiations, questions about strategic judgment inevitably arise.
Ultimately, history’s verdict will depend not on political speeches but on outcomes. If the current diplomatic process produces a durable agreement that could not reasonably have been achieved through earlier negotiations, Trump may justifiably argue that military pressure strengthened America’s bargaining position. However, if the final settlement closely resembles one that diplomacy might have delivered before the conflict, historians may conclude that the military campaign imposed immense human, economic and strategic costs without fundamentally altering the destination. In international relations, the true measure of success is not the ability to wage war, but the wisdom to secure a just and lasting peace before war becomes necessary. The latest reports from Iran deny that the United States is a party to the ongoing dialogue in Oman and firmly reject any suggestion that negotiations are linked to the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz. If these reports are accurate, they cast further doubt on President Trump’s repeated claims that Iran requested dialogue with Washington
—The writer is senior Rtd Bureaucrat.
