Muqaddam Khan
IT is true that a man thinks and plans one thing, and something else happens. Pakistan’s Afghan policymakers had to face the same fate during the 45-year war in Afghanistan.
When a bloody coup d’état was staged in April 1978 and the former Soviet Union occupied Afghanistan in December 1979, it was only the beginning, but no one predicted that the assembling of jihadist forces from across the world would shake global security to its core, changing the security paradigm, especially in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Various Pakistani analysts predicted that after the Russian withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Afghan Mujahideen would emerge victorious, marking the end of anti-Pakistan forces and the beginning of a new era of cordial relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan. It was hoped that Peshawar would become a hub of trade for the landlocked Central Asian Republics, culminating in Pakistan’s economic prosperity.
After the suicide blast outside the district and sessions courts building in Islamabad in November last year, Defence Minister Khawaja Asif wrote on X: “We are in a state of war. Anyone who thinks that the Pakistan Army is fighting this war in the Afghan-Pakistan border region and remote areas of Balochistan should take today’s suicide attack at the Islamabad district courts as a wake-up call: this is a war for all of Pakistan…” Pakistan, in fact, faces a long war against terrorism and jihadist forces. Firstly, when it comes to Pakistan, Al-Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban and other jihadist forces embrace each other, allegedly receiving support from hostile external actors. Pakistan believes that Israel and India remain among its deadliest adversaries and exploit every opportunity to weaken the country by backing anti-Pakistan militant groups. The agenda to destabilize Pakistan, cripple its economy and isolate it is viewed as an enduring objective.
Secondly, whether the Taliban remain in power or in the opposition, the war on Afghanistan’s soil is likely to continue in different forms. This suggests that relations between the Taliban and the TTP will remain warm, with far-reaching implications for Pakistan. A UN report stated that Taliban fighters joined the TTP in its war against Pakistan and that the TTP established training camps and safe havens in Afghanistan. Earlier, the Taliban released hundreds of TTP fighters from Afghan prisons, who later joined their comrades.
Thirdly, the Afghan Taliban do not appear willing to curb the TTP. The jihadist forces led by the TTP are engaged in a bitter insurgency against Pakistan. The continued surge in terrorist incidents has created turmoil across the country, while the southern districts of KP and Balochistan remain in a persistent state of instability. Militancy has swiftly become one of Pakistan’s greatest national security threats. The TTP is ideologically aligned with the Afghan Taliban and, after the merger of militant groups, its strength reportedly reached 30,000 fighters.
Soon after the Taliban’s dramatic return to power in Afghanistan in August 2021, TTP suicide attacks and other destabilizing activities surged, prompting Pakistan to carry out airstrikes on TTP leaders and training camps inside Afghanistan. Deadly clashes between Taliban and Pakistani forces also erupted along the Durand Line, where militants continue to exploit the rugged terrain and maintain operational freedom under the cover of darkness.
Pakistan’s long war against terrorism is far from over. As militancy continues to evolve across the region, the country faces an enduring security challenge that demands sustained vigilance, national unity and a comprehensive strategy to safeguard peace and stability.
—The writer is based in Swabi and his areas of interest are Afghanistan and South Asian affairs
