The recent decision of the Afghan Taliban regime to construct a dam on the Kunar River has raised serious concerns in Pakistan and across the region.
It is difficult to comprehend why Taliban leader, Mullah Hibatullah Akhundzada, ordered the construction of a dam on a river that flows from Pakistanto Afghanistan and then re-enters Pakistan to join the Kabul River. According to Afghan media reports, the Taliban’s Minister of Energy and Water, Abdul Latif Mansoor, was directed by Akhundzada to “begin construction of a dam on the Kunar River as soon as possible.” The directive followed immediately after a brief border confrontation between Pakistan and Afghanistan in late October 2025.While Mansoor justified the move by asserting that “Afghans have the right to manage their own waters,” international water laws establish clear principles of shared usage, equitable rights, and mutual consultation between riparian states. Pakistan has every reason to be concerned, given that the Kunar River system is crucial for irrigation, hydropower, and drinking water in Pakistan. Afghanistan’s hydrological system consists of five major river basins; Amu Darya, Indus–Kabul, Northern, Harirod–Murghab, and Helmand. Both Pakistan and Afghanistan share nine rivers; three flows into Pakistan through KP and six through Balochistan. The total annual average inflow from Afghanistan into Pakistan is approximately 23 million acre-feet (MAF), with the Kabul River contributing 17.5 MAF. The Chitral River, known as the Kunar River in Afghanistan adds another 8 MAF, joining the Kabul River before re-entering Pakistan. Nearly 80% of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s agriculture depends on this river system. Afghanistan currently uses about 1.8 MAF of the shared water, expected to double to 3.6 MAF by 2030 with new dam projects. The country already operates 21 dams, including 11 on the Indus–Kabul basin, and plans 12 new dams along with over 200 hydropower projects requiring an estimated USD 3 billion investment. India pledged USD 2 billion in 2011 for these water schemes. If Afghanistan proceeds with major upstream dams, Pakistan’s Indus Basin flow could decrease by up to 5%, with severe effects on Rabi and Kharif crops. Unlike the Indus Waters Treaty (1960) between India and Pakistan, no formal water-sharing agreement exists between Islamabad and Kabul, despite several rounds of talks between 2003 and 2014.
International water laws emphasize equitable and reasonable utilization, the obligation to prevent significant harm, and mutual cooperation. Under these principles, Afghanistan cannot unilaterally construct large dams over transboundary rivers such as Kunar, whose waters are shared with Pakistan. Interestingly, the Afghan Water Minister has been asked to approach domestic companies for financing, an unlikely prospect given Afghanistan’s financial constraint. This suggests that the “domestic funding” narrative may simply mask external involvement. The motives behind the Kunar Dam construction are debated while keeping in view three queries; A) Why was the dam announced immediately after a border clash with Pakistan? B) What are the broader strategic designs behind this move? And C) Can Afghanistan realistically finance such a project? The timing strongly indicates a political motive. Mullah Hibatullah’s urgent order appears to be a retaliatory move; using water as leverage against Pakistan after the border tensions. The decision resembles India’s reaction after the Pahalgam “false flag operation” in April 2025, when New Delhi unilaterally suspended the Indus Waters Treaty. Both actions seem aimed at punishing Pakistan through water coercion.Afghanistan, it seems, is replicating India’s playbook, with both driven by similar motives and possibly the same external advisors. The Afghan Foreign Minister, Mullah Amir Khan Muttaqi, visited India shortly before this announcement; an event that many analysts view as central to the timing of Kabul’s decision. Debating the India factor; over the past four years, the Taliban regime has persistently undermined Pakistan’s security through its support of TTP and BLA elements. The Kunar Dam plan represents a new dimension of hostility; the water terrorism.Given Afghanistan’s dire economic condition, the only plausible explanation for this sudden dam initiative is external sponsorship, most likely from India. It is widely speculated that India has promised covert funding in exchange for strategic concessions and access to Afghan territory. India’s revival of stalled projects, signals its renewed determination to reassert influence in Afghanistan, this time by exploiting the Taliban regime’s isolation and Pakistan’s vulnerability.
Pakistan must respond firmly yet constructively. It should present a fact-based, confident narrative emphasizing its role as a responsible stakeholder committed to equitable water sharing. Water-sharing must also be raised in multilateral forums such as the Moscow Format, Quadrilateral (Russia–China–Pakistan–Afghanistan), and Trilateral (China–Pakistan–Afghanistan) mechanisms. A comprehensive water strategy between Pakistan and Afghanistan, covering all rivers flowing in both directionscan prevent future conflict. Only through dialogue, transparency, and legal commitments can both nations secure peace and stability in their shared hydrological future.
— The writer is Professor of Politics and IR at International Islamic University, Islamabad.
