THE latest SIPRI report marks a major shift in India’s nuclear strategy. Reportedly, 12 Indian nuclear warheads are now classified as operationally deployed for the first time, mated with delivery systems and operational forces driven by canisterized missile systems and submarines. India’s nuclear triad—land, air and sea—is maturing rapidly. Although officially India’s No First Use doctrine, stated in 2003, remains unchanged, the country’s posture is evolving. The induction of ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and always-ready canisterized missiles are the two key drivers of this shift, both signaling a more responsive and survivable nuclear force. However, deploying missiles mated with warheads represents serious danger, threatening broader regional security interests.
India`s stated nuclear doctrine is based on a pledge that the country will not use nuclear weapons first, but with a notable caveat that it may use them in case of attacks on Indian forces with chemical or biological weapons. Over the years, Indian government officials and various strategists have often held the NFU policy to represent the country`s status as a responsible nuclear state. At the same time, they have often advocated the abandonment of the country`s NFU commitment, suggesting that strict adherence to the NFU policy does not serve India’s interests, therefore, India may be the first to launch a nuclear attack during a military crisis. Notably, the Indian Defense Minister in 2019 said that despite the declared policy, the future policy will depend on the situation.
To this end, canisterization is the first step of the approaches that the decision makers adopt to enhance the first-use options, as it is considered a key prerequisite for a rapid launch/deployment. Canisterizing is the storing of missiles inside a tube, called a canister, so that the missile can be protected from the elements while being transported. This makes for easier handling of the missile. For years, it was assumed that India`s nuclear warheads were kept separate from the delivery vehicles.
What actually is the purpose of India’s canisterization approach? First, it potentially incentivizes the use of nuclear weapons in a crisis by keeping them ready for use. Second, it enhances the survivability of its nuclear force. For instance, the Agni-P is designed for second strike survivability and first strike capability. The Agni-P is part of this approach, with the ability to be canisterized, combined with the ability to move across India’s vast rail network, thereby complicating the opponent side`s ability to track such missiles. However, rail-based missile systems are creating more risks at home than for the rival, given the poor safety and security of India. Third, this also serves the goals under India`s strategy of escalation dominance in the region and its vertical proliferation drive.
However, there are increased risks attached to such an approach. Deploying missiles mated to warheads poses serious dangers, particularly between two nuclear-armed rivals. First, keeping nuclear weapons in a state where they can be used at short notice may create risks of accidental use, for instance due to false alarms or unauthorized actions during a crisis. This is particularly relevant in South Asia due to the short missile flight times between India and Pakistan. Second, the approach aligned with India`s shifting nuclear strategy and military posture, offering the incentive to use it first, thereby complicating the broader regional security landscape characterized by India-Pakistan dynamics, India`s pursuit of greater maritime influence vis-à-vis China and even the US, which is betting on New Delhi for the security of its strategic interests. Third, discerning a missile launched in a conventional role from a nuclear-tipped missile could potentially force a launch-on-warning posture on Pakistan and lead to early nuclear escalation.
This reflects a security approach that seeks to enhance its own security while threatening the security and survival of others. However, the approach can be questioned based on its feasibility and efficacy. The May 2025 conflict between India and Pakistan highlights the strategic realities of the region. Escalation dominance was never achieved and India was unable to end the conflict on its own terms. The much-debated technologies, such as the S-400 and Rafael jets, were undermined as a result of Pakistan’s firm response and technological capability. Therefore, such approaches only lead to a false sense of superiority over rivals and to strategic hubris, resulting in escalation to a dangerous level where termination remains uncertain.
—The writer is Associate Director Research BTTN, at BUITEMs, Quetta.
