IT is now established that the initial draft of the 27th Constitutional Amendment contained several clauses crucial to national interests, but these could not be included in the final draft due to objections raised by the PPP leadership.
Reports suggest that after the passage of the 27th Amendment, work has begun on the 28th Amendment, aimed at revisiting certain provisions of the 18th Amendment that many believe weakened the federation. The 18th Amendment was introduced as a major constitutional reform. A 22-member Constitutional Reforms Committee, headed by Raza Rabbani and comprising representatives of all parliamentary parties, was formed for this purpose. However, few people are aware that the process was also shaped by international dynamics. Under the NRO, General Pervez Musharraf had been assured—primarily by the United States—that he would remain president after the elections.
General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani was reportedly among those managing this arrangement. But Benazir Bhutto’s assassination on 27 December 2007 changed the political landscape overnight. Asif Ali Zardari assumed leadership of the PPP and the general election of 18 February 2008 yielded unexpected results. Zardari and Nawaz Sharif joined hands and pressured Musharraf out of power. Musharraf eventually resigned on Kayani’s advice, despite the fact that the coalition lacked the two-thirds majority required for impeachment. When Zardari became President on 8 September 2008, the groundwork for the 18th Amendment began almost immediately.
At Zardari’s oath-taking ceremony, Afghan President Hamid Karzai also made an appearance. I personally witnessed him whispering continuously to Zardari, consulting handwritten notes. The then PTV Chairman, Dr. Shahid Masood, later recounted being positioned directly behind Karzai. It is said that Karzai advised Zardari to erase the remnants of Musharraf’s legacy, repeal the 17th Amendment, devolve extensive powers to the provinces and move Pakistan toward a structure resembling semi-autonomous states, similar to the former Soviet model. It remains a mystery how a leader often openly critical of Pakistan received clearance to attend the ceremony. According to several accounts, Hussain Haqqani also played a significant role in preparing the final draft of the 18th Amendment, reportedly completing much of the work from Dubai.
By 2008, Musharraf had already lost public support. Musharraf once personally told me he was concerned about the new government’s actions, but by then he lacked both institutional and public backing. In his resignation speech, he presented a lengthy charge-sheet against the incumbent government, warning of economic deterioration. His concerns were not unfounded: within months of the PPP government taking office, the rupee, which had traded at 60 per dollar during Musharraf’s era, had fallen to around 90. With the support of Nawaz Sharif, Zardari pushed Musharraf out and moved swiftly toward passing the 18th Amendment, which became law on 10 April 2010. Many analysts argue that instead of strengthening the federation, the amendment shifted Pakistan toward a confederal model.
The intellectual foundation for this transformation traces back to the “Confederation Forum,” formed after the 1985 elections by Raza Rabbani, Mumtaz Bhutto and Abdul Hafeez Pirzada. The manifesto of this forum closely resembled the principles later embedded in the 18th Amendment. When it first appeared, veteran journalist Irshad Haqqani famously wrote that the manifesto contained no “Pakistan” in it. According to informed political circles, if the 28th Amendment materializes, major changes may occur at the federal level. It is widely speculated that Mian Nawaz Sharif could return as prime minister for a fourth term, with Bilawal Bhutto as Leader of the Opposition, while Asif Ali Zardari’s political future remains a subject of internal deliberation. The 28th Amendment is expected to include provisions that may shape Pakistan’s political trajectory for decades.
Turning to the by-elections held on 23 November, the PML-N’s strong performance—winning six National Assembly and six provincial seats—has further reduced its reliance on the PPP. The party’s strength in the 336-member National Assembly increased from 127 to 133 seats. When combined with MQM’s 22, PML-Q’s five, Istehkam-e-Pakistan Party’s four, Muslim League-Zia’s one, Balochistan National Party’s one and four independents, the governing alliance now commands 170 seats—one above the threshold for a simple majority. The most striking feature of these by-elections was the historically low voter turnout, as the opposition continued the undemocratic practice of boycotting elections—a trend with deep roots in Pakistan’s political history. Benazir Bhutto’s boycott of the 1985 non-party elections still casts a long shadow and MQM’s boycott of the 1993 Karachi elections allowed candidates with barely 9,000, 12,000 or 15,000 votes to win seats previously secured with over 100,000 votes. Those results were never fully accepted and political instability soon followed.
On 17 April 1993, President Ghulam Ishaq Khan dissolved the National Assembly and dismissed Nawaz Sharif’s government; though the Supreme Court restored it on 26 May, the crisis deepened, culminating in another dissolution on 18 July 1993 under a formula devised by Army Chief General Waheed Kakar and Lt. Gen. Ghulam Muhammad, leading to fresh elections in October 1993. In this context, while the winners of the 23 November 2025 by-elections have taken their seats, the dismal turnout casts serious doubts over the legitimacy and mandate of the new representatives.
—The writer is former Secretary Election Commission of Pakistan and currently Chairman National Democratic Foundation.
