Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan in disarray
Asif Haroon Raja
Baitullah Mehsud caught public eye after the death of Abdullah Mehsud in
July 2007. Within a short period of five months little known Baitullah
managed to spread his influence in all seven tribal agencies of FATA and
established Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in December 2007. After
nominating commanders in each tribal Agency, he then began to spread his
sway in neighboring settled districts of NWFP and created his tentacle
under Afridi in Darra Adamkhel. Links were established with militants in
Southern Punjab as well.
In early 2008, Fazlullah, heading TNSM in Swat got himself affiliated
with TTP and declared his allegiance to Baitullah. Taliban commanders
brooked no dissent and under the garb of Islam pursued ruthless policies
to eliminate their opponents and to terrorize locals. TTP made Pak Army
and not occupation forces in Afghanistan its chief target. Massive
funds, armaments and guidance were provided by their patrons in
Afghanistan to enable them to pay handsome salaries to their fighters,
suicide bombers and handlers, win over neutrals and to confront the
Army. Knowing their love for big money, CIA and RAW drenched them in
pool of dollars to make them dance to their tunes. In order to build up
image of Baitullah, Times magazine of early 2008 placed him among 100
most influential people of the world. Newsweek described him more
dangerous than Osama bin Laden.
From June 2008 onward, focus of attention of US leaders shifted towards
FATA. It was described as a breeding ground of terrorists and suicide
bombers where top leadership of Al-Qaeda were housed and from where
cross border terrorism into Afghanistan was taking place. It was
declared as most dangerous place and hub of Al-Qaeda; Bush as well as
Obama and other senior US-Nato military leaders maintained that unless
FATA was neutralized, turbulence in Afghanistan could not be controlled.
Pakistan came under tremendous pressure to do more to control militancy.
Pak army and ISI were accused of being linked with Taliban. Ignoring its
own dismal failures, Pak army was ridiculed that it was incapable of
confronting extremists challenge. US military adopted an aggressive
posture and drone attacks were intensified in North Waziristan Agency
(NWA) and South Waziristan Agency (SWA). Angoor Adda in SWA became chief
target where a security post was plastered and a ground raid was carried
out by Marines in September 2008. Reason for ire was that unlike
Baitullah led Taliban, fighters of Hafiz Gul Bahadur in NWA and Maulvi
Nazir in SWA preferred to wage Jihad in Afghanistan.
The new Af-Pak policy was formulated by USA in which area astride
Pak-Afghan border of two neighboring countries was made into single
battleground. It included eastern and southern Afghanistan, FATA and
Pashtun belt of Balochistan. While Pak Army was nudged to intensify its
operations in Bajaur, Swat and Waziristan, US-Nato forces duly beefed up
with additional 21000 US troops from Iraq planned to launch decisive
hammer to eliminate all extremists elements within dangerous battle
zone. US top leaders repeatedly expressed their intention to step into
FATA to hunt for wanted leaders of Al-Qaeda and Mullah Omar and exerted
pressure on Pakistan to accept the plan of joint operations. Pak
military leadership put its step down and made it clear that it would
not accept any intrusion of foreign troops on its territory. Plot
thickened when on 14 April, Holbrooke secretly met Gulbadin Hikmatyar,
former blue-eyed of CIA. In the wake of dangerous designs of Af-Pak
strategy, Baitullah saw through the double game of USA and considered it
prudent to swear allegiance with Mullah Omar and accept him as
Ameer-ul-Momineen. He forged an alliance with Maulvi Nazir, Haji Gul
Bahadur and with Maulana Faqir Muhammad in Bajaur Agency.
This declaration irked USA and on March 26, 2009, FBI declared Baitullah
most wanted terrorist linked with Al-Qaeda and announced $5 million head
money. Earlier on, USA had declared bounty of $25 million each for Osama
and Zawahiri, and $10 million for Mullah Omar. Pakistan followed suit
and announced reward of Rs 50 million for Baitullah on 27 June. It had
also announced reward money for 21 absconding leaders of Swat chapter of
Taliban under Fazlullah. Baitullah’s inability to come to the rescue of
Fazlullah, or to activate South Waziristan front because of his
declining health and shrinking liberty of action were other reasons of
American displeasure. His boast to attack Washington and claim that his
men had undertaken terrorist attack in a village near New York further
antagonized them. His position in Shrawangai village was hit by drone
for the first time on 14 February 2009, which caused reunification of
two bitter rivals Maulvi Nazir and Baitullah but split off Qari
Zainuddin Mehsud from Baitullah. Zain belonging to Baitullah clan joined
hands with Haji Turkistan Bhittani in Tank and the two decided to
jointly battle Baitullah. On 7 April, Nazir who had all along remained
pro-government accused the Army of planting homing devices on local
militant leaders for destruction by drones.
When the Army refused to rely on him and did not remove check posts in
his area of influence, he became non-cooperative and started to play a
double game. When troops in South Waziristan started creeping forward
towards Baitullah area to encircle him, it became essential for CIA to
eliminate him before he got captured or voluntarily joined hands with
the Army since latter knew the whole game plan of USA. From the time CIA
had started using drones as a means to intimidate people of FATA,
disrupt peace deals between Army and militants and to stoke resentment
against the government, it had never targeted Baitullah’s strongholds.
On three occasions, six figure grid reference of his location was given
but he was not targeted. US selective use of drones against
pro-government elements had become a cause of friction. Once Baitullah
became a liability for CIA and it feared that he may be captured by
security forces or he himself may spill the beans about activities of
CIA in FATA, it was decided to eliminate him. Mounting suspicions of
Pakistanis of its secret alignment with Baitullah had also to be
dispelled. These considerations impelled USA to give a green signal for
his elimination. First serious attempt was made in June and the other in
July. On both occasions, missiles missed Baitullah. He was finally
targeted on 5 August in the house of his father-in-law Ikramuddin where
he had gone to spend a night with his second wife.
His death led to reprisals in form of killing of Ikramuddin and seven
other family members. His sudden departure created leadership crisis
since each of the top contenders Hakimullah Mehsud, Waliur Rehman,
Maulvi Faqir Muhammad and Qari Hussain thought he was better than others
to takeover reins of TTP. Although Hakimullah has been pronounced the
new TTP chief, there are veritable reports that he had got killed in a
gun battle with Waliur-Rehman in August and an imposter (probably his
brother) had been presented to media. None of them enjoy authority and
standing as that of Baitullah to keep TTP as a single entity. Successful
operation of Army in Swat and its pro-active role against militants in
other areas has otherwise severely curtailed liberty of action of TTP
and is on the defensive. When Maulvi Nazir got besieged, he signed
accord with all other sub-tribes of Ahmadzai Wazirs on 3 September and
pledged to cooperate with Army. While situation in Swat to a large
extent has been normalized, ongoing operation in Khyber Agency against
Mangal Bagh and TTP is producing good results. It is likely that Army
would exploit ongoing disarray of Mehsud Taliban in South Waziristan and
strike in coming weeks.
—The writer is a Rawalpindi-based defence and political analyst. |
