Fighting extremism is “people’s war”
N N Khattak
America’s failure to target the Taliban and especially its leadership
since 2001 has left several deleterious consequences. To begin with: (1)
it has resulted in the creation of a “safe haven” for various terrorist
elements in the FATA responsible to plan more catastrophic attacks on
NATO/ISAF troops stationed in Afghanistan. (2) it has also resulted in
pressurizing the Government to withdraw from anti-terrorism operations
in an area that has long been lawless. (3) Further, it has allowed a
mushroom of violent extremist groups inside Pakistan resulting in the
rise of new Islamist militant groups sympathetic to al- Qaeda and
committed to waging a holy war against the Pakistan Government, the
liberal elements in Pakistani politics, as well as foreign adversaries
such as the United States.
The Pakistani Taliban commanders like Baitullah Mahsud, the chieftain of
the Mahsud tribe in South Waziristan; Maulana Faqir Muhammad who is
associated with the Tehrike-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammad and who operates
in the Bajaur Agency; Maulana Qazi Fazlullah, also affiliated with the
same group but operating out of Swat; Mangal Bagh Afridi, who leads the
Lashkar- e- Islami in the Khyber Agency and is believed to be part of a
larger local opposition network led by Mufti Munir Shakir; and Sharif
Khan and Nur Islam, tribal leaders who have demonstrated considerable
operational effectiveness in South Waziristan. The more extremist
outfits, to include Al-Qaeda elements, have sought to exact their
revenge by undertaking lethal suicide attacks against Pakistan security
forces and ISI personnel within the FATA and deep inside the nation’s
heartland in an effort to compel Pakistan to terminate its
counter-terrorism operations conclusively. The terrorists who conduct
suicide attacks in Pakistan, killing innocent people, constitute not
only a threat to the fledgling democracy but also to the country’s
sovereignty. Attacks of the kind conducted on the Marriott Hotel,
kidnapping of the Afghan Ambassador to Pakistan, Wah factory blasts,
etc, challenge the writ of the Government. If such acts are not
countered through persuasion or force, they would lead to destabilise
Pakistan. This is the prime responsibility of Pakistan. It is Pakistan’s
war and Pakistan’s army is fighting homegrown war for its homeland
security - time to acknowledge this war as our own. Pakistan’s security
forces are carrying out operation clean-up against militant outfits in
the restive Khyber agency, Hangu, Swat, Dara Adem Khel, Bajour and
Waziristan.
Terrorist attacks against non-combatants more than doubled in Pakistan
from 2006 to 2007, reflecting the growing violence in the country’s
turbulent tribal areas and new bombings against Pakistan Government
officials and security services. The War on Terrorism had a major impact
on Pakistan. After 9/11, it had to face direct threat of Al-Qaeda and
Taliban, which usually targeted high-profile political figures.
Terrorists killed 3,448 people from 1,503 attacks in Pakistan in 2007,
according to Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) security
report. Pakistan is at a war facing two threats to its integrity, from
the Americans on the one hand and the terrorists who continue to target
its cities on the other. The threat from the Americans comes in a number
of forms from pressure on the government to unilateral air strikes
inside Pakistan. The other threat comes from terrorists attacks led to
the killing of crowds of innocent people as happened in DI Khan, Wah
carnage, train bombings, Marriott Hotel etc.
Desirous of protecting Islamabad’s interests in these areas and to avoid
Pakistan becoming a target in the campaign against terrorism, Pakistan
requires confronting the sources of terrorism that had developed
internally in Pakistan. Two terrorist groupings were implicated in this
regard. (1) The unexpected growth in power of domestic sectarian groups
like the Sunni Sipah-e-Sahaba and its offshoot the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and
the Shia Tehrik-e-Jafria Pakistan and its offshoot the Sipah-e-Muhammad,
which were engaged in violent bouts of bloodletting within the country.
(2) The second group relevant to the Pakistan’s decision to declare war
against terrorism consisted of the Taliban remnants of the regime
ejected from power in Kabul as a result of American conquest of
Afghanistan. After their defeat, the core Taliban leadership - along
with those Pakistani Pashtuns who had joined their movement crossed over
the Afghanistan-Pakistan border into the relative safety of the FATA.
Pakistan’s military, accordingly, began to prosecute the war against
Al-Qaeda with great vigour. This military campaign, which took the form
of a gigantic cordon-and- search operation, had several consequences.
First, it resulted in the capture of numerous Al-Qaeda and other
extremist operatives — some 700 at last count. Second, it has secured
major gains in eradicating some domestic anti-national sectarian
terrorist groups.
By all accounts, Pakistan is strongly committed to purging both Al-Qaeda
and the Taliban. Pakistan repeatedly identified the “Talibanization” of
Pakistan as the most pressing threat facing the state. Drawing a
distinction between “die-hard militants and fanatics,” who “reject
reconciliation and peace” and accordingly must be targeted and the
larger Taliban cadres, “most of [whom] may be ignorant and misguided”
but “are a part of Afghan society,” Pakistan has urged international
community to begin instead a campaign of reconciliation with the Taliban
focused on “winning [their] hearts and minds.” Pakistan’s attitude
toward the Taliban thus remains multifaceted: referring to
Talibanization as a species of extremism that “represents a state of
mind and requires [a] more comprehensive, long-term strategy where
military action must be combined with a political approach and
socio-economic development.” Pakistan is also opposed to what it calls
“terrorist elements and foreign militants” within the movement, which
Pakistan acknowledges “must be dealt with a strong hand.”
The new Government in Islamabad is remaking the country’s
counter-terrorism strategies, to include negotiating with some of the
most hard-line militants. A combination both use of force and civil
dialogue with those who were misled into supporting extremists, has been
the most viable policy of the Government. As in FATA there are many in
the rest of the country who differ with the government’s policies,
particularly its reliance on the US. The best way to force it to set its
direction right is not to take up arms but to resolve the issue inside
the Parliament. Throughout Pakistani society in general, there is a
growing weariness with the counter-terrorism operations presently being
waged on the country’s soil. Recent polling, for example, suggests that
most respondents overwhelmingly oppose allowing outside forces to combat
Al-Qaeda on their national territory. A survey recently conducted by the
Program on International Policy Attitudes at the University of Maryland
in collaboration with the U.S. Institute of Peace found that that
“Pakistanis reject overwhelmingly the idea of permitting foreign troops
to attack Al-Qaeda on Pakistani territory. Pakistanis overwhelmingly
oppose US-led efforts to fight terrorism—59% oppose America’s anti-
terror campaign, while only 13% back it.
This is Pakistan’s war because Pakistan itself has suffered from
terrorism. Pakistan has its own strategy against terrorists and would
not allow external elements to undermine its counter-terrorism efforts
which are contrary to the popular emotion in Pakistan. The West had to
play its part. To avail the chance of defeating the suicide bombing may
require a level of indefinite economic commitment. Washington needs to
pour significantly more money into rural development. What United States
can do is: (1) restructure the current counterterrorism intelligence
liaison relationship between the United States and Pakistan in order to
acquire greater insight into the existing terrorist networks operating
within Pakistan. (2) Continue to assist Pakistan with the technology and
the training to prosecute small-unit counterterrorism operations more
effectively. (3) Continue disbursing coalition support funds to Pakistan
as per past practice. (4) Integrate the ongoing political transition in
Pakistan - including the growing national clamor for a genuine return to
democracy. Given political compromise, education, and socio-economic
development in tribal belt, it may be possible for Pakistan to defeat
the scourge of terrorism. |
