Afghanistan under transition
Bassam Javed
Afghanistan bears a long chequered history since 654 AD wherein various
invaders that raided the country failed in conditioning Afghan populace
to follow their respective ideologies. At least twenty five dynasties
have ruled Afghanistan all of whom tried to incorporate part or all of
the country into their vast but often short lived empires. As a
contrary, some of them managed to integrate and some got themselves
merged with the Afghan population during the process. Afghanistan, due
to its cultural diversity and its strategic location, used to be
referred to with various names such as ‘Gateway of South Asia’, ‘The
Heart of Asia’ etc.
Today, Afghanistan again finds itself standing at the cross-roads of
history, plagued by uncertainty, confusion and a civil war. The first
major event to affect the time leading to the present state of
Afghanistan was the return from political exile of Muhammad Daud khan in
1973, who had earlier served as the prime minister of Afghanistan until
1963. It was during his tenure that the left wing officers of his army
introduced a series of reforms including land reforms and progressive
measures in relation to women and education. The reform package hurt the
interests of Afghan land lords and the Mullahs and slowly destabilized
the society. Then the event of soviets entry later in Afghanistan and
the capture of its capital Kabul in December 1979 proved to be the last
straw in the destabilization of the country.
The Americans saw this as a unique opportunity and provided billion of
dollars in military aid to the Mujahideens to further their interest in
the region. In the process, soviets were humiliated and withdrew from
Afghanistan whereas the Mujahideens took control of Kabul. The
subsequent fighting between the Northern Alliance and the Mujahideens
gave rise to a new breed of fighters called Talibans.
However, it was the major event of 9/11 that formed the basis for the
direct intervention of US in Afghanistan. The Americans mobilized the
Northern Alliance, to oust the Talibans from Kabul. The Taliban withdrew
to their areas from Kabul and dispersed to the south and the east. They
were not militarily defeated neither eliminated from the system. The
southern and the Eastern areas of Afghanistan remained dormant till the
time NATO forces entered into Afghanistan in 2003 and the insurgency was
started. The major causes that gave rise further to this insurgency
comprised the natural sympathy in Pashtun dominated areas for the
largely Pashtun Talibans, keeping Pashtun tribal leaders at bay through
indiscriminate bombing of their areas resulting in large civilian
deaths, non-inclusion of Pashtuns in main stream politics and
disenchantment of local populace due to non development, massive
corruption in the society and other injustices etc:
The NATO forces are contemplating an increase in the number of Afghan
army to 120000 plus with a budgetary estimate of approximately 17
billion dollars over five years. This decision appears to be the outcome
of two factors: the increase in allied casualties and the hope to find a
way of putting an end to the fighting and then exit. As in the case of
Iraq, the NATO have no clear exit strategy in Afghanistan also but hope
that somehow both of these expensive conflicts, in terms of lives lost
and monetary expenditures incurred, will end by themselves one day. But
the history tells us that wars are ended through negotiated settlements
whereby all the sides involved agree to abide by a set of terms and
conditions that bring peace and stability to the area of conflict.
Now, there appears to be a growing realization amongst the NATO allies
to work out the exit strategy. In this relation, a rather secret
strategy paper on the ongoing mission in Afghanistan was discussed
amongst the NATO leaders at their Bucharest meeting wherein for the
first-time, a step by step outline has been documented for when the NATO
troops can be pulled out. The authors of the secret paper seem to have
been quite realistic while formulating the list of benchmarks. One of
the benchmarks put in by the authors include achievement in placing on
ground a well trained Afghan army with around 80000 soldiers. The other
related benchmarks worked out in the same paper include levels of
competencies for the Afghan soldiers as well as logistical capabilities
of the Afghan army. The experts are of the view that given the various
conditions to improve the Afghan army and meet the benchmarks,
withdrawal of NATO forces from Afghanistan seems unlikely in a
foreseeable future.
Notwithstanding the ulterior motives of US presence in Afghanistan, it
needs to be understood by the US that while pursuing their long term
objectives in the region, they must not forget the lesson from history,
which is, Afghans have never been subjugated by the invaders / foreign
forces in the past. Thus it would be in the interest of US/NATO forces
to wrap up their so-called unfinished agenda and be on the roll sooner
than later unless they wish to see another Vietnam like humiliation in
Afghanistan. |