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Torture: fruitless evil
Comment
Philippe Sands
OVER the past five years the name Mohammed Al-Qahtani — detainee 063
at Guant?namo — has been indelibly associated with the Bush
administration’s efforts to justify extreme measures in the “war on
terror”. This Saudi was apprehended in Afghanistan in late 2001 and
taken to Guantanamo in early 2002, included in a group labeled as
the “worst of the worst”. His identity got a full airing in June
2004, as the administration struggled to contain the fallout from
the Abu Ghraib pictures.
Alleged to be the 20th hijacker, Al-Qahtani became its justification
for abandoning a longstanding prohibition on the use of cruelty by
the military. Two of the administration’s most senior lawyers —
White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales and Defense Department General
Counsel Jim Haynes — stood before the world’s media and laid out the
official story to explain the move to aggressive interrogation: It
occurred as a result of a bottom-up request from an aggressive
combatant commander at Guantanamo; it was implemented within the law
and on the basis of careful legal advice; and it produced useful and
important results.
Al-Qahtani was living proof that coercion worked: He was a person in
whom the Pentagon had “a considerable interest”, who had “been
trained to resist our interrogation techniques” and, most
significantly, who gave up important information when subjected to
new techniques authorized by Rumsfeld in December 2002. This
included information on José Padilla (the alleged “dirty bomber”)
and Richard Reid (the shoe bomber). The message was unambiguous:
Qahtani was a bad man, aggressive interrogation works.
A few weeks later, the 9/11 Commission report described Al-Qahtani
as a “candidate hijacker”, explaining the circumstances in which he
was denied entry to the US in August 2001. The narrative persisted,
and Al-Qahtani’s name was frequently wheeled out again in defense of
the administration’s actions.
A few weeks ago the Department of Defense announced that Al-Qahtani
would join five others in facing a military commission on various
criminal charges, including murder, attacking civilians and
terrorism. The death penalty would be sought. The allegations were
thin on detail and — strikingly — made no reference to any
information obtained after the new techniques were used. The
announcement was consistent with what, by then, I had already been
told: The abusive interrogation of Al-Qahtani produced nothing of
value.
The administration raised the stakes on Al-Qahtani. He was presented
as the kind of uniquely dangerous person for whom the program of
detention and interrogation was designed, proof that the established
rules were quaint and obsolete, that new rules and techniques were
needed, and that they worked.
Then, earlier this week, the administration made an astonishing
announcement: The charges against Al-Qahtani were dropped.
Proceedings against five other would continue, but the Pentagon
official in charge of war crimes cases declined to authorize charges
against Al-Qahtani. What happened?
No explanation was given for the abrupt change of direction. That in
itself is telling. There is no plausible reason that can be sold or
spun. For the truth is that Al-Qahtani was subject to abuse that
most likely rises to the level of torture, in circumstances that are
notoriously public around the world. From Nov. 23, 2002, over a
period of 54 days, he was subject to aggressive interrogation at the
instance of the highest echelons of the administration.
I have written at length explaining how Rumsfeld and his team came
to be involved. On Dec. 2 2002 Rumsfeld signed a memo prepared for
him by Jim Haynes, authorizing the use of new techniques. It is a
famous memo, the one in which Rumsfeld inquires, in his own hand, as
to why standing during interrogation is limited to four hours since
he stands for eight or more hours a day.
I journeyed around America, meeting many of the principal characters
involved in the decision-making process. Al-Qahtani’s treatment
amounted to a war crime. The decision to move to aggressive
interrogation came from the top down and not, as the administration
claimed, from the ground up; those at the top may face war crimes
investigations abroad, unless the US gets its house in order.
Despite it all, Al-Qahtani’s interrogation provided no meaningful
information.
Against this background, the House Judiciary Committee has recently
embarked on a series of hearings to examine the role of senior
administration lawyers in promoting aggressive interrogations. The
treatment of Al-Qahtani lies at the heart of this inquiry. It is a
grim story, of decision-making driven by fear and ideology and
incompetence, of crime and of cover-up.
It seems likely that the charges against him were dropped because
proceedings before a military commission would have turned the
spotlight on his treatment and, even more dangerously, on those most
senior individuals — politicians and political appointees — with
whom responsibility lies.
The abuse of Al-Qahtani has backfired, as many down at Guant?namo
predicted it would. The truth of his involvement, if any, in the
events of Sept. 11 will not be established. He will no doubt linger
in a limbo of legal uncertainty in the bowels of Guantanamo or
whatever other place may be found for him, a totemic figure whose
treatment will be invoked by those who seek to harm the US.
This unhappy story has brought America’s fine tradition of military
valor into disrepute. It has provided no added protection to the
country; instead it will serve to inflame public opinion abroad, and
undermine the very objective of national security that was sought,
making it more difficult to respond to the real threat of
international terrorism. If the House Judiciary Committee does
nothing else, it must establish the facts, to identify those who are
responsible for this mess, to make sure lessons are learned so it
doesn’t happen again. The lesson of torture is clear. It does not
work.
— The Guardian
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